State of the world
This page looks for broad global patterns using long-term data from V-Dem for institutions and Maddison for income. It is a separate exploratory analysis, not a forecast, and it does not change any country's score.
Three measures of global improvement
Institutions, income, and human capital can improve at different times, so they are shown separately. Each number is a global 10-year improvement rate compared with its own median from 1850 to 2012.
As of 2024, only 1 of 3 measures is above its historical median. Institutional gains and declines are both high, so the net change is small.
Net institutional change
This measure subtracts the share of countries in institutional decline from the share in institutional improvement. The study compares two periods:
- Previous decade: what had already happened at the reference date.
- Following decade: what happened after the reference date.
The two periods can look different. At the 1973 reference point, the previous decade showed institutional decline, partly because of reversals during decolonization. The following decade improved by 8 percentage points during the Third Wave of democratization. The 1913 reference point showed the opposite pattern: a calm previous decade followed by decline.
Why the current reading is incomplete. The historical comparison depends on the following decade, which has not happened yet. The current net reads +1 percentage point, roughly flat. That is not a clear signal of either institutional repair or decline.
What followed three global slowdowns
Three times, a sustained global growth boom has been followed by a rapid fall of nearly the same magnitude, roughly 1.5 percentage points per decade. The sample contains only three episodes, so the comparison is descriptive.
| Episode | Peak to 10 years later | Fall | Sequel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belle Époque | 1.8% → 0.5% | −1.3 points | WWI, interwar collapse, WWII |
| Trente glorieuses | 3.3% → 1.4% | −1.9 points | Stagflation, then a manageable political transition |
| Second globalization | 3.4% → 2.0% | −1.4 points | Global financial crisis, stagnation, and populism; still ongoing |
The same shape produced one catastrophe and one manageable transition. So you cannot read the outcome off the deceleration. What appears to matter is net institutional change during the fall: 1913's institutions were collapsing alongside the slowdown (net −1 point to −6 points by the 1930s) and it ruptured; 1973's were surging (net +8 points) and it was absorbed. Today reads +2 points on V-Dem but eroding underneath. This is a flat or slightly weakening reading.
This comparison covers three global growth cycles and n=2 completed outcomes. That is too small for a statistical law or a prediction of catastrophe. It does show that the current slowdown lacks the clear institutional strengthening seen during the comparable 1973 episode.
How country scores are moving
The current period has elevated gains and losses that largely cancel each other out. The categories below show how country-level scores are moving within the five-pillar dataset:
Only 2% of countries show an institution-led ascent, while roughly a quarter show income gains without similar institutional gains. Human capital usually changes slowly and tends to rise over long periods, so the 39 percent broad-rise category should not be read as rapid institutional improvement.
This gauge is more useful for describing the current level than for projecting the next movement. Its uncertainty notes should be read alongside every result.